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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
CARRmRS-~l>GRAM NOT ORDER lli;QUIRED BY Bn.r, OF LADING-A car of
oil was shipped over the defendant's line to the order of the consignor,
"notify Royal Crown Soap Limited." Plaintiff purchased the cargo, and the
bill of lading was indorsed to him. Upon arrival of the car at its destination,
the defendant notified Royal Crown Soap Limited. Plaintiff was notified, and
sent this telegram: "Am doing all possible locate documents in order stop
demurrage suggest you establish bond to produce documents and unload car."
The soap company advised the defendant of receipt of the telegram, and the
carrier, relying upon this, allowed the company to unload the car. Held, the
telegram was not authority to deliver without production of the bill of lading;
that at best it was a suggestion as to how possession of the oil might be obtained before the plaintiff could locate the necessary documents. First Nat.
Ba11k of Chicago v. Rogers, Brow1i a11d Co., (1921), 273 Fed. 529.
When no bill of lading is issued, the carrier is justified in treating the
consignee as owner, and may deliver the goods to him without requiring
presentation of a bill of Jading. Schlichting v. C.R. I. & P. R'y. Co., 121 Ia.
502. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the .
consignee was to gain possession of the goods without production of the bill
of lading. Edelsto11e v. Schimmel, 233 Mass. 45. Where nothing appears in
the bill of lading to the contrary, the carrier may treat the consignee as
owner of the goods, and may deliver them to him without his producing the
bill of lading. Pratt v. N. P. Express Co., 13 Ida. 373. If the carrier has
notice of the fact that the consignee is not owner of the goods, delivery to
him is conversion. Any kind of notice is sufficient. See Nat. Ba11k of Chester
v. Atla11fa a11d Charlotte Air Line R'y. Co., 25 S. C. 216; Atlantic Navigation
Co. v. Johnson, 27 N. Y. Super. 474- Proper indorsement of an order bill of
lading gives the indorsee an unqualified right to the goods. Paxson Bros. v.
Warfield, 6 Ga. App. 315. It is not a breach of duty for the carrier to surrender the goods to such indorsee without his giving the bill of lading to the
carrier, though this was agreed to between consignor and carrier. Chicago
Packing and Provision Co. v. S<Wamzah, Fla. a11d Westerii R'y. Co., 103 Ga.
140.. The carrier may not deliver the property to the consignee until the bill
of lading is properly indorsed, if it is provided in the bill of lading that it
shall be surrendered properly indorsed before the delivery of the shipment.
So11tlzem R'y. Co. v. Massee a11d Felton Lmuben Co., 23 Ga. App. 309. Nor,
if the bill of lading provides that it shall be surrendered only when indorsed
by the consignor, may the carrier deliver the goods to the consignee, without
such indorsement and surrender of the bill of lading, though the bill of lading
directs the goods to the consignee or his order. Thomas v. Blair, 185 Mich.
422. If goods are shipped to the order of the consignor, "notify'' a third
person, at destination, a delivery to such third person is conversion by the
carrier, unless by the order of the consignor. North Pe1111. R. R. Co. v. Commercial Ba11k, 123 U. S. 727. If a carrier delivers goods without requiring
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presentation of the bill by the consignee, and is forced to reimburse the
consignor, it cannot later recover from the one to whom it delivered the
goods, who has paid for them, as there is no delivery by mistake, according
to the usual meaning of that term. Long Island R.R. Co. v. Strnctural Concrete Co., no N. Y. S. 379. Under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, a delivery of the goods by the last carrier without
requiring a surrender of the bill of lading makes the initial carrier liable to
any holder of the bill of lading. Winget v. Grand Tmnk Western R'y, 210
Mich. 100. A shipping receipt naming a third person as consignee is not a
bill of lading, and so need not be produced before delivery of the goods by
the carrier. Gree1i v. B. and 0. R. R. Co., 2o6 Mass. 331. Nor is it necessary that a non-negotiable bill of lading be surrendered or presented to the
carrier before delivery of the goods. Pe1m. R. R. Co. v. Titus, 142 N. Y. S. 43
When the consignee has made part payment, and tender of the balance due for
tne goods shipped to the order of the consignor, it is wrongful for the consignor to withhold possession of the bill of lading; the consignee is equitably
entitled to the goods, and the carrier under such circumstances is not liable
for transferring the goods to the consignee. The Asiatic Prince, 108 Fed.
287. Stipulations for production of the bill of lading before delivery of the
cargo may be waived by the express or tacit consent of the consignor, as by
having acquiesced in prior deliveries without the production of the bill of
lading. Salberg v. Pa. R. R. Co., 237 Pa. 495. The test for determining
whether there is an express waiver by consent, other than an indorsement
and transfer of the bill of lading, seems to be whether the shipper has caused
"the carrier reasonably to believe another person is the owner of the goods,
and entitled to their possession. Thus, a conclusion contrary to that reached
in the principal case was obtained in Schwarzschild and Sulzberger Co. v.
Savamtah, Fla. and Western R'y. Co., 76 Mo. App. 623. The telegraphic
instructions to the consignee in that case were: "Use your stuff. Get railroad inspection your car; receipt for same in damaged condition." So in
Mitchell v. C. & 0. R'y. Co., 17 Ill. App. 231: "Do the best you can; whatever you do will be satisfactory." The construction placed upon the telegraphic authority in the present case, considered in view of the test enounced,
is unquestionably correct.
CHARITiltS-BEQUEST TO TowN ON CONDITION OF PERPETUAL CARE OF BURIAL
LoT VALID-Testator bequeathed to a town, on condition that it perpetilally
care for his burial lot, a sum greater than was needed for that purpose. The
heir-at-law sought to secure such excess amount. Held, a good bequest to
the town, which, under the statutory authority to purchase and hold real and
personal property for public uses, may .take property by will on consenting
to act as trustee of the fund for care of the burial lot. Petition of Tiittle
(N. H. 1921) u4 Atl. 867.
While a perpetual trust for the maintenance of a cemetery is valid, a trust
to perpetually care for a grave violates the rule against perpetuities and is
void, apart from statutory permission. McCartney v. Jacobs, 288 Ill. 568, 4
A. L. R. u20, note, Shipper v. fodiistrial Trust Co. (R. I. 1920), uo Atl. 410.
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'!'he reason is, of course, that the first is a charitable purpose, the second is
not. Of efforts to circumvent this rule there is no end. In re Tyler (1891) 3
Ch. 252, upheld a bequest on such a condition, where a larger sum than
would be needed for that purpose was bequeathed, on the ground that there
was nothing to show that funds for the care would not be secured elsewhere
in order to secure the bequest, and so no part of the bequest would be used
for the purpose. A similar bequest was upheld in Roche v. M. Dermott,
[1901] I Ir. 394, though the court said the contract to care for the lot which
the charitable society was required to enter into as a condition precedent to
the gift taking effect, was unenforceable, binding on conscience only. In re
Davis, [1915] I Ch. 543, approved in In re Tyler, s1tpra, but held that as the
gift over was not to a charity the first gift was freed from the obligation to
repair the graves. '!'he court took no notice of the argument urged on its
attention that the fund was so small it would be entirely required to keep up
the graves, and the charity would get nothing. A safer method of securing
perpetual care is that of the principal case, viz., a bequest to a municipal corporation having power to receive such trust funds in perpetuity. See also
Shippee v. Ind1tstrial Trust Co. (R. I. 1920) no Atl. 410.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FoRSIGN CORPORATIONS

-Defendant, a sheriff, levied on a motor truck belonging to plaintiff, a
Pennsylvania corporation, for non-payment of the North Carolina license.
Laws N. C. 1917, c. 231, § 72, imposed a license tax on automobile manufacturers with a proviso that the tax on such manufacturers who had invested
three-fourths of their assets in state securities or personal property within the
state should be only one-fifth of the amount imposed on others. Plaintiff
sued to restrain the sale, asserting that the act denied plaintiff the equal
protection of the laws, and was an attempt by the state to regulate interstate
commerce. Held, (two justices dissenting), the act is unconstitutional.
Bethlehem Motors Corporation v. Fly11t, 41 Sup. Ct. 571.
'!'he Supreme Court of the United States, in the instant case, has added
another decision on the position of the foreigu corporation in constitutional
law, following along the path marked out in Westem Unioti Telegraph Co.
v. Ka11sas, 216 U. S. I; P1tllmmi Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; So1~them Ry.
Co. v. Gree11e, 216 U. S. 400. Preceding these cases the doctrine had been set
forth that since a state had the absolu'te right to exclude foreigu corporations,
it therefore had the right to admit them on any condition it saw fit, Pa11l v.
Virginia, 8 Wall, 168, except that the state could not prevent a foreign corporation from doing interstate business within the state, Pensacola Telegraph
Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., g6 U. S. I. Since 1go6 further
qualifications have been added to the effect that the state cannot impose
unconstitutional conditions, Donald y. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 241 U. S. 329,
nor provisions contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to due process and equal protection of the laws, Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, supra,
Westeni Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supra. In the case at bar the
court say that either the corporation is within the jurisdiction of North
Carolina or out of it, and if it is assumed that the plaintiff is within the
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jurisdiction, in the sense of having an agent therein and doing business
within the state, then it has been discriminated against. The proviso in the
statute can be satisfied by a resident manufacturer, his factory and its :i;>roducts in the first instance being within the state; it cannot be satisfied by a
non-resident manufacturer, his factory necessarily being in another state,
some of its products only at a given time being within the state. But if it
is assumed the corporation was not within the state, the act was an attempt
to -regulate interstate commerce by levying a tax on imports, because a tax
on an agent of a foreign corporation for the sale of a product is a tax on
the product, and if the product be that of another state, it is a tax on commerce between states, and hence invalid. W eltoii v. Missouri, 9I U. S. 275;
Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 2o8 U. S. n3. For other references see HENDERSON, TH£ POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN A.M!l:RICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL
LAW, Chapter 6 et seq.; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S.
I35; i6 MICH. L. Rev. 264, 447; 9 MICH. L. Rev. 549; BEALE ForunGN CoRPoRA'rioNS, Chapter 5.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Excess PROFITS TAX-INVESTED C.APITAir-Plaintiff claimed a refund of $1,o81,184.61 paid as excess profits tax under title II
of Revenue Act of 1917 (Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 302 et seq.). The Act provides
for deduction from income. of a sum equal to a certain percentage of the
invested capital and surplus for the taxable year, which shall be exempt
from the tax. Plaintiff had bought, in 1904. certain lands for $190,000, which
increased in value to about $ro,ooo,ooo by 1912. Plaintiff declared a stock
dividend against this increase, by taking back the old stock, and giving twice
as much new stock in return. In the tax return for 1917, the assessor refused to include the $ro,ooo,ooo increase as capital or surplus. On demurrer to the petition for refund, held: the demurrer should be sustained. La
Belle Iron Works v. United States, (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528.
It was contended by the plaintiff that (1) the increase in value should
be included as invested capital, or paid in or earned surplus; (2) should be
considered as property paid in for stock under Sec. 207 (a) (2) of the Act;
(3) that the construction based on cost alone was arbitrary, and violated due
process of law. Most of the opinion is an interpretation of what Congress
meant by "invested capital." It seems quite clear that Congress had in mind
the cost basis, rather -than present value. The court disposed of the second
contention by saying that the exchange of stock was a purely internal transaction, referring to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. l8g, which decided that
stock dividends were not income as regards the income tax. The court
showed that the purpose of Congress was to tax income in excess of a certain
return on the capital actually embarked in the enterprise, and called the appreciation of value simply an unearned increment. This is not a new conception of capital. In Bailey v. Clark, 21 Wall 284, a case arising under a
Revenue Capital tax, it was said that the term applied "only to the property
or means contributed by the stockholders as a fund or basis for the business
or enterprise for which the corporation was formed." And see statement in
Iii Re Simon, 268 Fed. loOO at p. loo8. For other examples of what is and
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what is not "invested capital," see Cartier v. Doyle, 269 Fed. 647, holding that
money put up by one of a partnership as security for loans to the partnership
was invested capital for the e..'>:cess profits tax; and Tire Co. v. Iredell, 268
Fed. 377, holdi~ that patents, rented out to third parties on certain royalties,
were not invested capital. It is difficult to see any possible argument against
the constitutionality of the Act. The court held it not to be unreasonable of
Congress to adopt the cost basis, thus resting values on experience rather
than on vague anticipation of market values. It was argued that the tax
would operate so unequally as to deny due process, and two cases under the
Fourteenth Amendment were cited; Southem Ry. Co. :v. Greene, 216 U. S.
400, and Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55. The latter
involved a paving tax based on frontage and area, the tax being held invalid
because of gross inequality. It was pointed· out that the Fifth Amendment
has no equality clause, although it would seem that even under the Fifth
Amendment, inequality, if sufficiently gross, would of itself show lack of due
process. The paving tax case would be more analogous if the tax in the
principal case were on capital, instead of on income. On the contrary, it is
submitted that the tax burdens are borne less unequally with the cost basis,
than if any valuation basis had been used. The principal case is valuable
incidentally in helping to clear the legal-economic concept of value. Capital
assets, converted into cash, were decided to be income for the income tax;
Merchants Loa1i and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 386; 19
MICH. L. REv. 854. Unconverted capital assets, in the form of property, are
neither capital nor income, but simply an unrealised, unearned increment.
CoNSTITUTIONAr, !JAw-JumcrAr, Rsvmw oF ORDER oF A CoM:r.r1ssroN-

A water company in Pennsylvania appealed from an order of a commission,
claiming the rate fixed by it to be confiscatory. A state statute authorized
the reviewing court to ascertain whether such an order of a commission was
"reasonable and in conformity with law." Under this statute the court reversed the order saying there had been an erroneous valuation of the company's property. On appeal to the state supreme court the latter held the
reviewing court to be outside its jurisdiction in exercising its judgment as to
the valuation of the property since there was competent evidence to support
the finding of the commission. The United States Supreme Court held, that,
under the construction given it by the state supreme court, the statute was
unconstitutional in that it did not give the reviewing court the power to
exercise its own judgment as to the facts and therefore denied due process.,
Brandeis, Holmes and Clark, JJ., dissenting. Ohio Valley Water Company
v. Ben Avon Borough, et al, (June 1920), 253 U. S. 287, 64 L. Ed. 908.
Rate making, historically and in its very nature, is a legislative function
delegated to commissions for reasons of expediency. It is well settled, however, that the order of such a commission must be reviewable in a court at
the suit of an interested party who deems it unjust, otherwise due process is
denied. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line C.o., 2II U. S. 210. But as to the
extent of this review the principal case presents a difference of opinion. The
dissenting opinion states that a review of questions of law, including whether
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the finding is reasonably supported by the evidence is enough. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541; People v.
McCall, 245 U. S. 345, (semble). But the majority hold that the reviewing
court must have an opportunity to determine the issue "upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts." It will be noticed that this gives
the court a broad~r scope than it has in reviewing the act of a judicial body,
its power there extending only to the limits outlined in the dissenting opinion
of this case. 2 ENcYC. PL. AND PR. 390. The cases cited in support of the
decision, while clearly recognizing the right of judicial review to the extent
allowed in the dissenting opinion, do not seem to go farther and hold that
it extends to a review of the findings of fact themselves. It would seem that
an experienced rate making commission would be more peculiarly fitted than
a reviewing court for ascertaining the value of property. Such ascertainment
is a matter of opinion based upon a study of the facts. If the opinion of the
commission has been reached after a hearing which has allowed the interested
party ample opportunity to present the facts, he should have no right to have
a reviewing court again pass on the weight of these facts. It would seem
that the holding of the principal case extends the scope of judicial review
to include that which is not necessary for the protection of the individual
under the due process clause, and it is submitted that practical difficulties
will be found in the application of the doctrine.
CoNTRAcrs-AcCEPTANCS To TAK£ EFFtcT IN Tm: FuTuru>-P placed an
order for goods through D's traveling salesman. On receipt of the order
D wrote, on October rst, saying that same would receive prompt attention;
that since it was a first order P's credit would have to be investigated; but
that just as soon as this investigation was completed he would be advised in
regard to the acceptance of his order. On October 25th (certain prices having
risen in the meantime) D wrote a second letter in which he stated that P's
order had been entered for part of the goods only and that the other kinds
had been withdrawn from the market pending the credit investigation. In an
action for breach of contract for not delivering all the goods ordered it was
held, that D was liable. Gilmer Bros. Inc. v. Wilder Mere. Co. (Ala. 1921).
88 So. 854
It is not clear from the opinion of the court whether it regards the contract as having been completed at the moment when the letter of October 1st
was posted, or at the moment when the credit investigation was finished. If
it intended to decide the former the holding would clearly be erroneous, for
then we should have a pretended acceptance seeking to bind the offeror
subject to a condition not specified in his offer. Nothing is better settled in
the law of contracts than that an act to be effectual to complete a contract
must amount to an unqualified assent to the terms proposed in the offer. If
it does not, it not only does not create a contract but in addition amounts to
a rejection of the offer. Hyde v. Wrench, :5 Beav. 344; Minneapolis etc. Ry.
Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., II9 U.S. 149. See also the numerous cases
cited in 13 c. J. 281. sec. 86. However, where the offeree accepts the terms of
the offer unqualifiedly, at the same time stating in effect that he intends his
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acceptance to be effectual only upon the happening of a ilamed contingency,
there is no reason why the law should not carry out his intention. In that
event the contract is not formed until the contingency has happened. In the
meantime either party is at liberty to withdraw. Of course there is always
the possibility that the offer has been withdrawn or has lapsed between the
time of the receipt of the offer by the offeree and the happening of the named
contingency. It might also be necessary for the offeree to give notice of the
happening of the contingency where, as in the principal case, it is one that
lies peculiarly within his knowledge. This requirement would not prevent
the contract being complete at the very moment that the contingency happens.
Cf. Bishop v. Eato1~, 161 Mass. 496. See l WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 51a.
CoNTRACTS-WAGERS-F1xmG Prucs BY FUTURE VAr.us.-Defendant delivered cotton to plaintiff "on consignment," plaintiff making a deposit with
defendant of the market value of the cotton at the time of delivery, and the
parties agreeing to adjust the price in a prescribed manner according to
market quotations up to a future date, when, in the words of the written
agreement, the cotton was "to be sold outright" to the plaintiff. Held that
the deposit constituted the real consideration and that the agreement to adjust
the price by the future value of the cotton was a separable wagering contract,
and therefore void. Moore et al v. Seay and Co., (Tex., 1921) 228 S. W. 6Io.
The court reaches its conclusion by holding that title passed on delivery
and that thereafter the seller could have no legitimate interest in the future
value of the cotton. To reconcile the principal case with cases in Texas and
elsewhere in which courts have enforced agreements of buyers to pay a higher
price should the article prove worth more than what was paid, the court says
that those were not wagering contracts because the risk of loss was only on
one side. But this is not the basis of the decision in this type of case. The
ground that such cases go on, as appears where the deciding court takes the
trouble to state the obvious, is that the parties to a sale can adjust the consideration as they please so long as it bears a reasonable relation to the value
of the thing sold. Smith v. Du11ca11, (Texas) 209 S. W. 140; Phifer v. Erwi11,
100 N. C. 59; Ferguson v. Coleman, 3 Rich. L. (S. C.) 99; Phillips v. Gifford,
104 Iowa 458; Newell v. Smith, 53 Conn. 72; Dixie foclttstrial Co. v. Benson,
(Ala.) 79 So. 615. The fact that title has passed does not necessarily destroy either party's interest in its future contingent value. Ferguso1i v. Coleman, and cases cited sitpra. It is true that when the contingency is a political
election or something having no bearing on the value of the thing sold, payment adjusted by it is a wager. Da1iforth v. Evans, 16 Vt. 538; Bates v. Clifford, 22 Minn. 52. But if the parties to a sale wish to pass title immediately
and make the price the market value of the article at a future date, it is their
privilege. See cases cited supra. In the principal case the court seems to have
been overzealous to find a wager. It has applied some of the principles of
futures to a present delivery contract and has failed to give this contract the
benefit of the almost universally recognized rl,lle that even in futures, when
actual delivery is intended, the contract is not a wager. Kinsey Co. v. Board
of Trade of City of Chicago, 1g8 U. S. 236.

234

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

Co~NANT FOR TITI;e-WAY oF NECESSITY As AN INCU:MBRANCE.-Defendant conveyed a farm by warranty deed to the plaintiff without mentioning
the fact that a third party claimed a way of necessity over a portion of the
same. This fact did not appear in the abstract and plaintiff had no knowledge
of it until after the sale had been consummated. Plaintiff brought 'suit, based
upon the covenant against incumbrances in the warranty deed, to recover
damages. Held, there was an implied reservation in the deed with reference
to the way of necessity and that it was not an incumbrance. Reed v. Bl!tm,
( 1921) 215 Mich. 247.
The principal case is based on a line of cases which hold that a deed of
warranty does not estop the grantor to claim a way of necessity over the land
granted. Schmidt v. Quinn, 136 Mass. 575; Briglta11~ v. Smith, 4 Gray (Mass.)
297; New York & New E11gla1W Railr.oad Co. v. Railroad Com'r, I62 Mass.
81. In this connection, and on such facts, courts have indulged in general
expressions to the effect that ways of necessity are not incumbrances. These
statements were seized upon by the court in the principal case and applied to
a situation having nothing in common with the circumstances of the cases
from which the statements were taken. A careful examination of these cases
shows that the main question before the court was that of construction of the
deed. And they have uniformly held that a way of necessity is an exception
to the rule that deeds are construed in accordance with their terms,-that the
generality of the covenant is limited and qualified by the nature of the estate
conveyed. Such reasoning has no application to the situation in the principal
case, where the main question is not that of construction of a deed but whether
a way of necessity constitutes an incumbrance. An easement, generally speaking, is an incumbrance, as for instance, in the case of a private right of way
over the land conveyed. Blake v. Everett et al, l Allen (Mass.) 248; Wilson
v. Cochran, 46 Pa. St. 229. And it makes no difference whether the easement
arose by operation of law, without the· voluntary agreement ·of the servient
owner. Railroad rights of way are generally considered incumbrances. Beach
v. Miller, 51 Ill. 2o6; Quick, Adm. v. Taylor, II3 Ind. 540. Tax liens, though
arising by operation of law, are held to be incumbrances. Almy v. Himt, 48 Ill.
45; Eaton v. Clzesebrough, 82 Mich. 2I4- Also, dower rights. Walker v. Deaver
79 Mo. 664; Bigelow v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 19.:;. By analogy it would seem that
a way of necessity, although arising by implication of law or fact, should be
held to be an incumbrance. It is surprising that the court in the principal
case has arrived at a decision for which there is no support in decided cases
or in principle.

CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO Krr.r.-INTENT.-The defendant shot at A with the intention of killing him, but accidentally hit and
wounded B. He was indicted for an assault with intent to kill B. Held,
defendant was properly convicted under the indictment. Jones v. State
(Texas, I921), 231 S. W. 122.
The principal case raises the question whether in the crime of assault
with intent to kill, intent and violence must coexist in respect to the person
assaulted. It answers in the negative. "The assault is only required to be
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with an intent to kill; that is an intent to kill someone." Quoted with approval
from Mathis v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 549. In charging an assault with
intent to kill, where by statute a specific intent is made a part of the crime,
undoubtedly that intent must be proved. Under such a statute A, intending
to shoot B, but accidentally shooting C, cannot properly be convicted of an
assault on C with intent to kill C. State v. Mitlhall. lQQ Mo. 202; People v.
Keefer, 18 Cal. 637; Ann. Cas. l912A, lo63, note; contra, Callahan v. State,
21 Ohio St. 3o6. Cases in which A shoots at C, supposing him to be B,
should be distinguished, for here there is a specific intent to kill the person
assaulted. McGehee ·v. State, 62 Miss. 772; People v. Torres, 38 Cal. 141.
But where, as in the principal case, the statute by its terms makes criminal
an assault with intent to kill, and does not expressly restrict the intent to
kill to the person assaulted, A, intending to shoot B, but accidentally wounding C, may be convicted of an assault on C with intent to kill. Mathis v.
State, supra, 37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 172, note. The indictment in the principal
case transcends the statutory requirement and restricts the intent to the
person assaulted, and therefore. on principle, it would seem that an intent
to kill the person injured is of the essence of the crime charged and should
be proved. State v. Shanley, 20 S. D. 18. In view of the indictment, the
effect of the court's decision is to treat the restrictive allegation as mere
surplusage.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE oF OTHtt OFnNSES SHOWING SYsT:eM.-In a
prosecution for larceny of a brooch, evidence was offered that the witness
who had pawned this brooch for the defendant had similarly pawned other
jewelry for him. There was no evidence as to where the defendant had
obtained such other jewelry except some articles which, it appears, had
been taken from the store from which the defendant was accused of taking
the brooch, though in effect the defendant admitted that all the jewelry was
stolen. The evidence of pawning the other jewelry for the defendant was
held admissible to show a system under which his operations were conducted. McClelland v. State (Md. 1921), u4 Atl. 584.
One of the exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes
is when the other acts are so connected by common features as to indicate
a plan. I WlGMORE ON EVIDENCE, §346. But "there must be such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained
as caused by a general plan of which they are individual manifestations."
ibid., §~04. A person who commits one crime mav be more likely to commit another, yet, logically, one crime does not prove another and cannot be
:;hown, unless there is a certain relation existing between them. J ay11es v.
People, 44 Colo. 535. Disagreement as to whether such relation exists, and
the confusing of evidence of system with evidence to show intent, motive,
absence of mistake, and identity, has caused a seeming conflict in the decisions. See People v. Moline11~, 168 N. Y. 264 62 L. R. A. 193; State v.
Gillies, 40 Utah 541, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 776. Evidence of other crimes
tends to confuse the defendant in his defense, raise a variety of issues, and
be highly prejudicial to him. Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16; State v. Hyde,
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234 Mo. zoo. Due to this fact, the test of relevancy of evidence to prove
system should be rigidly adhered to and that part of the principal case here
noted does not seem to comply with the test above quoted. Disposal of
other stolen jewelry does not seem to show· a plan pursuant to which the
brooch in question was taken, the two acts appear quite unconnected, with
no concurrence of common features, and the holding seems doubtful in the
application of the law to the particular facts as stated in the opinion.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL A<::r-ACTION FOR BENE11IT OF Rsr.ATm5 OF
DECEASED NOT MAINTAINABLE AGAINST WRONGDOER'S ADMINISTRATOR.-D's

intestate shot and killed P's wife. Shortly afterwards the former died. P
now sues D, as administrator, under a statute, which follows Lord Campbell's Act, conferring on relatives of deceased persons a right of action for
wrongful death. Held, action cannot be maintained against administrator
after death of wrongdoer. Demezuk v. Jenifer (Md., 1921), II4 Atl. 471.
It is a familiar rule of common law that personal actions die with the
person. Statutes authorizing a right of action for wrongful death for the
benefit of relatives of deceased, being in derogation of common law, are
construed strictly. Where they follow the language of Lord Campbell's
Act the decisions in the various states are unanimously in accord with the
principal case, whether the action be commenced originally against the
wrongdoer's administrator. Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, L. R. A. 1916A,
n42; Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176; CarriKai~ v. Cole. 35 R. I. 162; or is
sought to be revived against him, the wrongdoer having died after action
brought and before jud'gment. Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 403, II L. R. A. (n.
s.) II57; Kranz v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 155 Wis. 40, Ann. Cases 1915C, 1050.
However, the action against the wrongdoer's administrator is upheld in a
number of states, generally not by virtue of the statute conferring the right
of action on the relatives of the deceased person, but by authority of some
other statute expressly providing for the survival of personal injury actions.
Devine v. Healy, 241 Ill. 34; Morehead's Admr. v. Bittner, 1o6 Ky. 523.
Such statutes, when remedial in character, should be construed liberally.
Hackensack Trust Co. v. Vanden Berg, 88 N. J. Law 518. A statute providing that no action except suits for penalties and for damages merely
vindictive shall abate by the death of either party has been construed to
extend the remedy under a Death Act against the representative of a deceased
wrongdoer. The recovery for benefit of relatives of deceased is for the
pecuniary injury to them alone, and the action cannot be considered as a
punishment for the defendant. Collier v. Arringto1i, 61 N. C. 356. But see
Davis v. Nichols, 54 Ark. 358, where an earlier statute providing for the
survival of actions ex delicto by· and against the representatives of both
parties was held not to extend the remedy, under a later statute following
Lord Campbell's Act, against the administrator, the wrongdoer having died
pending suit. It was held that the earlier statute applied only to prevent
subsisting causes of action from abating, whereas the action for benefit of
relatives was a new cause of action which the death originates. The statute
on this subject in Texas expressly provides that, if the defendant die pend-
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ing suit, the action may be revived against his executor or administrator,
but this does not confer a right of action against the latter where the wrongdoer has died before the suit is brought. Joh11-so1i v. Farmer, 89 Tex. 6rn.
The Maryland statute providing for the survival of personal actions expressly
excepts actions for injury to the person where the defendant dies, and the
principal case rightly holds that this statute does not help the plaintiff's cause.
DIVOR~-VAI.IDI'l'Y OF Fo~IGN Dt~Ar.IMONY.-Parties were married
in Iowa and removed to Arkansas, where the wife obtained a divorce, the
husband being served by publication and no personal jurisdiction being
obtained. No provision was made for alimony and the wife started a separate action for alimony in Iowa. Held, the action was not maintainable.
McCoy v. McCoy (Iowai, 1921), 183 N. W. 377.
In another case, plaintiff was domiciled in New York and married
defendant in Washington, D. C. Previously, defendant and X had been
married in Missouri and had moved to Texas, which was their last matrimonial domicile. X left defendant in Texas, went to Nevada, and there
obtained a divorce. Defendant never appeared in the divorce proceedings,
service being by publication. Plaintiff now claims the marriage between
himself and defendant was invalid, as defendant was not legally divorced
from X. Held, if the wife, at the time the divorce was procured, was domiciled in Texas, her status there controls, and if Texas recognizes such a
decree as was obtained in Nevada, on the ground of comity, it will be recognized in New York; as neither party to that decree was a New York
resident, the state's policy of protecting its residents against foreign divorce
decrees, based on constructive service, is not involved. Ball v. Cross (N. Y.,
1921), 132 N. E. xo6.
The courts in the instant cases have again been confronted with the
perplexing questions arising from the lack of uniformity in our state divorce
laws. In Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, the husband and wife were
domiciled in New York, when the husband left her and acquired in good
faith a domicile in Connecticut, there obtaining a divorce based on constructive service on the wife, who remained domiciled in New York and made
no appearance. The wife subsequently sued for divorce in New York and
obtained personal service on the husband, who pleaded the Connecticut judgment as a bar. The United States Supreme Court held that the Connecticut
decree rendered, not being based on personal jurisdiction, was not entitled
to full faith and credit in New York under the federal Constitution. In
Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, L. R. A. 1918C, 355, the parties were married
in Nebraska, but removed to Arkansas, and in a divorce proceeding the
Arkansas court rendered a decree based on personal jurisdiction over both
parties, and a,llowed certain alimony. The wife then commenced an action
in Nebraska for a further amount of alimony, alleging that the value of
certain Nebraska property had not been considered in computing the alimony. The court held that the full faith and credit clause made obligatory
the enforcement of the Arkansas decree in Nebraska and that that decree
was a conclusive determination of the alimony to be given. It will be noted
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that the Arkansas decree was rendered with personal jurisdiction over both
parties and the question of alimony was distinctly raised and passed on in
that court. In Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 34 L. R. A. (n. s.) no6,
the complainant sought a divorce and alimony from the defendant, who
pleaded as a bar a divorce rendered in Virginia. The matrimonial domicile
was Tennessee, but defendant had left his wife and obtained a bona fide
domicile ill Virginia before getting the divorce. The Virginia decree was
based on publication and without service of process on, or actual notice to,
the wife. Held, an action for alimony can be maintained by the wife still
domiciled in the state of the matrimonial domicile of the parties, although
the husband may have obtained a divorce from her based on service by publication in a foreign state. Here the court protects its own resident. In
Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 18 L. R. A. (n. s.) 647, the matrimonial domicile was in Georgia, but the husband got a bona fide domicile in Kansas and
obtained a divorce based on constructive service on the wife, she retaining
her Georgia domicile. In a separate alimony suit in Georgia the court
enforced the Kansas decree on the ground of comity and held it conclusive
as to the amount of alimony. The wife had actual notice by mail. To be
effective to cut off further suit for alimony in another state, the decree
must be valid in that other state either because of the full faith and credit
clause or because of comity. If the decree is valid, since alimony is incidental to the marriage relation, and as divorce dissolves that relation, nothing
then remains from which the alimony can arise. Roe v. Roe, 52 Kan. 724
See also Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158. Contra: Th1trst01i v. Thursto1i,
58 Minn. 279; Adams v. Abbott, 21 Wash. 29; Toncray v. Toncray, supra.
The New York case at bar limits the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock, supra,
very strictly, applying it only when a resident of New York is one of the
parties to the foreign decree and is injured by it. For further discussion,
see 13 MICH. L. R.Ev. 420; II MICH. L. R.Ev. 508; L. R. A. I9I7B, 1032, note;
L. R. A. I9I7F, n61, note; L. R. A. I9I5E, 42I, note; 9 L. R. A. (n.s.) 953,
note.
EQUI'.rY-INJUNC'.rION AGAINST WRONGFUL OUSTER OF PUBLIC OFFICER.The appellant held the office of clerk of the Recorder's Court in Detroit,
by appointment, and was notified that the judges of this court had decided
to dispense with his services, without having given him a hearing as to his
competency. Held, that a court of equity had jurisdiction to enjoin the
wrongful removal of the plaintiff. Beck v. Keidan (July, I92I), 2I5 Mich. 13.
Other authorities have held that equity does not have jurisdiction to
enjoin the removal of a public officer on the ground that its aid is sought
to protect a political right as distinguished from property or civil rights.
The United States Supreme Court held that a Nebraska court had no power
to enjoin the ouster of a police judge upon action by only three members
of the city council when an ordinance required action by the whole council.
In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200. The court relied upon Gee v. Pritchard, 2
Swanst. 403, which held that equity jurisdiction was limited to the protection
of property rights. But see EQuITABL~ RELmF AGAINST DEFAMATION, ROSCOE
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PouNn, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640. In re Sawyer, supra, left the determination
of the right to public offices exclusively to courts of law, which might exercise this power by certiorari, error or appeal, mandamus, prohibition, writ
of quo warranto, or information in the nature of quo warranto. That case
is followed in Illinois, where the court refused to enjoin the removal of a
physician appointed by the board of managers of the state reformatory.
Marshall v. Board, 201 Ill. I. Similarly, an injunction was refused on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction where it was sought to enjoin the removal
of the keeper of the penitentiary and putting the sheriff in charge under a
void statute. Corscadden v. Haswell, 177 N. Y. 499, 17 HARV. L. Ri>v. 575.
In re Sawyer, supra, was also relied upon in a recent Indiana case, where
the Appellate Court refused to enjoin certain school trustees who were
alleged to be conspiring to prevent the plaintiff from assuming his duties as
a newly-elected trustee. Haupt v. Schmidt (Ind., 1919), 122 N. E. 343. But
immediately following this decision the Supreme Court of Indiana held that
a supervisor of oil inspection was entitled to injunctive relief against a rival
appointed by the state geologist, who was interfering with his duties, the
court holding that the legal incumbent was entitled to protection until the
right of the contestant was determined at law. Felker v. Caldwell (Ind.,
1919), 123 N. E. 794- In Texas a distinction is drawn between an injunction
sought to protect the right to the office as against a rival claimant for the
office and an injunction sought to protect the enjoyment of the office as
against those who are making no claim to it themselves. The former is
held to be a political right over which equity has no jurisdiction, and the
latter is held a proper case for relief. For example, an injunction was refused
to restrain a newly-elected officer from taking the oath of office until his
election could be contested. Jacksoii v. Houser (Texas, 1918), 108 S. W.
186. But it was held that an injunction would be granted in favor of an
officer against one in possession of another office who claimed the right to
perform the duties and collect the fees rightfully belonging to the plaintiff.
The court pointed out that the inherently political dispute between rival
claimants for the same office was not involved, in which case it admitted
that it could not enjoin. Troilo v. Gittinger (Texas, 1921), 230 S. W. 233.
Where the governor of Wisconsin summarily and without proper hearing
attempted to remove the insurance commissioner, an injunction was granted.
Ekem v. McGovem, 154 Wis. 157· In the principal case the court, in justifying and limiting its decision, referred to the fact th11t there was no one
claiming the office of the plaintiff, and it was only acting to protect the
plaintiff's possession of the de jure and de facto office from wrongful interference. And it also admitted that its decision would not deter~ine the
plaintiff's right to retain the office, but that the judges of the Recorder's
Court might remove him after notice and a proper hearing. This does not
seem to be an exercise of political jurisdiction, and the result appears desirable from the standpoint of the inadequacy of the plaintiff's legal remedy
and from the standpoint of the public's interest in insuring the stability of
public offices from wrongful interruption.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
EQuI'tY-UNJi'AIR Co:MPE'tI'l'roN-"Mutt AND JEFF" PROTECT~ FROM
"PIRACY."-Complainant was the originator of a "comic strip" popularly
known as the "Mutt and Jeff" cartoons. These cartoons were copyrighted
in the complainant's name and published in the San Francisco Examiner.
Later the complainant continued the series under contract with the defendant, publisher of the New York American. At the expiration of this contract the complainant -agreed to continue the series for a syndicate and the
defendant prepared to imitate the "Mutt and Jeff" strip in a manner likely
to deceive the public into thinking the cartoons were the complainant's. In
a· suit to restrain this imitation, held, defendant enjoined from use of words
"Mutt" or "Jeff" and from publishing cartoons so like complainant's as to
deceive. Fisher v. Star Cc. (N. Y., 1921), 132 N. E. 133.
The decision is based squarely upon the jurisdiction of courts of equity
to restrain unfair competition, no reliance being placed either upon copy_right law or trade-mark law. The great majority of cases have had to do
with unfair competition in the manufacture and sale of goods. The leading
authority for the protection of intangible property from unfair competition
is biternational News Seruice v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, in which
the defendant was enjoined from "pirating" news gathered by complainant
and passing it off as its own in competition with the complainant. This case
has been said by some to stand for the broad proposition that no one shall
be permitted to appropriate to himself the fruits of another's labor. 32
HARV. L. R:Jw. 566. However valuable as an ethical concept, such a sweeping
proposition is hardly maintainable as a matter of law. 13 Ir.L. L. fuv. 7o8;
18 MICH. L. fuv. 415; Bristol v. Equitable As.mrance Society, 132 N. Y. 264In the instant case the court, with admirable discretion, refrained from laying down any broad doctrine, preferring to decide each case on its particular
set of facts. - The threatened imitation was found to be essentially unfair
to the complainant, and no good would accrue to the public from refusing
the injunction. It is to be noted that the instant case differs from the Associated Press case in that here there is the typical "passing off" element, the
defendant passing off its own work as the complainant's, whereas in the
Associated Press case defendant was publishing complainant's news as its
own. See 51 NAT. CORP. Rs.>. 242 for comment on previous litigation between
the parties in the instant case.
I
(

EvrntNCS-'I'RIAJ:;S--WHEN A CouR't MAY DIRECT A VERDIC't.-ln a suit
for violating an agency contract, the defendant attempted to prove that the
provision in question ·had been orally waived or annulled. The evidence of
the existence of the provision: was so preponderant that no other conclusion
was reasonably admissible. Held, the court·erred in refusing to instruct the
jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham (1921), 274 Fed. 316.
At one time there was a rule to the effect that a mere scintilla of evidence was sufficient to require a determination by the jury, but this has been
abandoned by most courtS, the federal and various state courts holding that
the test for direction of a verdict by the judge is the same as on a motion
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after verdict to set it aside as being against the overwhelming weight of
evidence. Schofield v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 114 U. S. 615; Gunther
v. Liverpool & Lo1ulon & Globe Ins. Co., 134 U. S. uo; Fornes & Co. v.
Wright, Baldwin & Haldaiie, 91 Ia. 392; Market aiul Fulton Nat. Ba11k v.
Sargent, 85 Me. 349.. See also THOMPSON ON TluAI.s, Sec. 2245. However,
the refusal of the New York court in McDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.,
167 N. Y. 66, to accept such a test as that laid down by the federal courts
would seem to be well founded, inasmuch as setting aside a verdict involves
a matter of remedy and procedure and gives a retrial by another jury,
whereas a direction of a verdict is a matter of substantive and substantial
rights and is generally final. The latter is in effect a ruling that as a matter
of la\y the party can or cannot recover, whereas a verdict may be set aside
and a new trial granted because it seems to the court that the preponderating
weight of the evidence is the other way and that an opportunity should be
given for the reweighing of the evidence on another trial. Between those
views lie the decisions of courts recognizing different amounts of evidence
as sufficient to require determination by the jury, such as "evidence tending
to prove," Offutt v. The World's Colm11bia1i E~position, 175 Ill. 472; "evidence from which, when undisputed, a finding would 'be justified," Ohio &
Miss. Ry. Co. v. Dmm, 138 Ind. 18; "evidence legally sufficient to warrant a
verdict," Catlett v. Ry. Co., 57 Ark. 46r; "where as a matter of law no
question of credibility or issue of fact remains,'' M cD01iald v. Metropolitan
St. Ry. Co., supra. As will be seen from an examination of the authorities,
no clear-cut rules can be laid down for the determination of all cases, inasmuch as the weight of evidence differs in imperceptible degrees and is never
precisely the same. But all courts would no doubt hold that where there
is no evidence tending to prove the constituent facts set up by the party sustaining the burden of proof, or where the evidence is undisputed and conclusive one way, the court should direct a verdict. Gustafson v. Eger, 126
Mich. 454; Scott v. Nickm1i, 193 Pa. 371; Woodward v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. Co., 145 Fed. 577; Toomey v. B. & S. C. Ry. Co., 3 C. B. (n. s.) 146;
Wakelfo v. Londo1i & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 12 App. Cases 41. "No evidence''
has been interpreted as meaning "none that ought reasonably to satisfy the
jury that the fact sought to be proved is established." Ryder v. W ombwell,
L. R. 4 Exch. 32, reaffirmed in Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackso1i, L. R. 3 App.
Cases 193; State v. Prince (N. Car., 1921), 108 S. E. 330. Certainly there
should be no question for the jury if the probative force of the evidence is
so weak that it raises only a mere surmise or suspicion of the fact sought to
be established. Joske v. Irvi1ie, 91 Tex. 574. As said in State v. Prince,
supra, "the legal sufficiency of proof and the moral weight of legally sufficient proof are very distinct within the conception of the law. The first
lies within the province of the court, the last within that of the jury. The
province of the jury should not be invaded in any case, and when reasonable
minds, acting within the limitations prescribed by the rule of law, might
reach different conclusions, the evidence must b«: submitted to the jury."
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INJUNCTION-LABOR UNIONS-EFFJ!CT oF CLAYTON ACT.-An injunction
was issued against defendant labor union and individuals representing labor
interests, prohibiting their interfering, by picketing, with the operations of
a manufacturing company engaged in interstate commerce. Held, such an
order did not violate the Clayton Act, Sec. 6 (COMP. S. 8835f), providing
that the existence and operation of labor organizations is not forbidden and
that such organizations and their members shall not be held to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the anti-trust laws.
Q11folivan v. Dail-Overland Co. (C. C. A., 6th Circ., 192I), 274 Fed. 56.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act has frequently been before the courts, and
it is now well established that that section of the act has not changed the
law as it existed prior to its enactment as to the enjoining of labor unions
which were acting in violation of the anti-trust laws. See Alaska S. S. Co.
v. Longshoremm's Assn., 236 Fed. g64; Stephms v. Ohio State Telephone
Co., 240 Fed. 759; Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; IS MICH. L. Rsv.
671. Section 6 is the other important section of this act which has to do
with labor organizations. It begins: "The labor of a human being is not
a commodity or article of commerce." This does not prevent the acts of
combinations of laborers from coming within the purview of the Sherman
Act if they interfere unlawfully with interstate commerce in commodities.
KALES, CONTRACTS AND Co:MBINATIONS IN RssTRAINT OF TRADE, §I57. It is
next provided that the anti-trust laws shall not be construed to forbid the
e..-...:istence and operation of labor organizations instituted for the purposes
of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain them or their individual members from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof. This is nothing more than common law;
nor does the Sherman Act expressly or by implication forbid what this portion of the act allows. But the converse is not true. The act does not allow
such organizations to carry out legitimate objects unlawfully nor lawfully
to act toward illegitimate ends. This is well pointed out in Dail-Overland
Co. v. Willys-Overland (this same case in the court below), 263 Fed. I7I.
The same case holds that after as well as before this legislation, injunction
lies against a labor organization making an improper use of its powers. The
concluding clause of Section 6 says that "such organizations [i. e., such as
are described in the preceding excerpt] and the members thereof" shall not
"be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trad'e under the anti-trust laws." Mr. Kales, in the work above quoted,
Sec. I59, says: 'The care with which Section 6 affirms the legality of organizations and acts which were valid at the common law, and therefore under
the Sherman Act, raises the inference very clearly that labor organizations
and the acts of such organizations, which, by reason of their being not
merely for mutual help but for the purpose of monopoly and to exclude
others from the ,labor market, were illegal at common law and under the
Sherman Act, are still illegal under the Clayton Act." Subsequently decided
cases have justified this position. The principal case, as well as the case
below, refrained from passing on this point as well as on the first clause of
the section; the court below saying that plaintiff, in asking for an injunction
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against picketing, was not calling upon the court to decide that labor was a
commodity or that the defendant union was a combination in restraint of
trade. The principal case dismisses consideration of Section 6 with the
statement that it did not apply to the facts. However, in Lamar v. U. S.,
26o Fed. 56!, it was held that this section does not prevent a criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act, for a conspiracy to restrain foreign trade by
inducing or causing strikes, on the grounds that the act did not permit lawful organizations to be used for improper purposes. In Duplex Co. v. Deering, supra, the point was directly raised in the United States Supreme Court.
This was a case of secondary boycott, which the court recognized as coming
within the rule of Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (holding that labor organizations, while not unlawful per se, may be unlawful if they act in restraint
of interstate commerce, contrary to the provisions of the anti-trust laws),
unless the Clayton Act should forbid~ In interpreting Section 6, the court
arrived at the same conclusion as Mr. Kales, saying: "There is nothing in
Section 6 to exempt such an organization [i. e., a normal labor organization]
or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal
and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination· or conspiracy
in restraint of trade." The result of the decisions is that the Clayton Act
has neither added to nor detracted from the law of equitable relief from
the legally unjustifiable acts of labor organizations.
LAw oF NATIONS-R.EcoGNITION-VALIDITY ABROAD oF Acrs oF AN UNRECOGNIZED GoV£RNM£NT.-The plaintiff was a Russian company which had been
engaged in the manufacture in Russia· of veneer or plywood. The Soviet
government confiscated its mill and manufactured stock. Subsequently the
Soviet government sent to Great Britain a commercial delegation: under the _
headship of L. B. Krassin. Krassin sold a part of the confiscated veneer to
defendants. When the veneer arrived it was claimed by the plaintiff company.
Plaintiff's right depended upon the validity of the Soviet decree of confiscation. The validity of the decree in a British court, depended upon the
recognition which Great Britain had given the Soviet Government. Communications from the Foreign Office were admirably calculated to mystify.
Defendants' solicitors were informed that "His Majesty's Government assent
to the claim of the Delegation to represent in this country a State Government
of Russia." To an inquiry from the plaintiff's solicitors, on the other hand,
the Foreign Office replied as follows : "I am to inform you that for a
certain limited purpose.His Majesty's Government has regarded M. Krassin
as exempt from the process of the Courts, and also for the like limited
purpose His Majesty's Government has assented to the claim that that which
M. Krassin represents in this Country is a State Government of Russia, but
that beyond these propositions the Foreign Office has not gone, nor, moreover, do these expressions of opinion purport to decide difficult and, it may
be, very special questions of law upon which it may become necessary for
the courts to pronounce. I am to add that His Majesty's Government have
never officially recognized the Soviet Government in any way." Roche, J.,
held that the Soviet Government had not been recognized, and gave judg-
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ment for the plaintiff. [1921] 1 K B. 456. The defendants appealed. Thereafter the British Government concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet
Government and the British Foreign Office announced that the Soviet Republic
was recognized as the de facto Government of Russia. The Court of Appeal
approved of Justice Roche's decision as based upon the evidence then presented, but unanimously reversed the decision and non-suited the plaintiff
because of the recognition which had been extended meanwhile to the Soviet
Republic. Luther v. Sagor & Company, 37 T. L. R. 777, 65 s, ]. 604.
The case is an interesting illustratioru of the utter dependence of the
courts upon the political departments of government in all matters pertaining to the recognition of foreign states or governments. The question is
discussed in 18 MICH. L. Rsv. 531.
MARRIAGE-VALIDI'l'Y OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGI>.-A statute provided
that marriages should be celebrated only by certain persons, and that any
unauthorized person solemnizing a marriage should be fined and "such marriage shall be void, unless it be in other respects lawful and be consummated
with the full belief by either of the parties in its validity." Plaintiff and
decedent had agreed to take each other as man and wife, and had cohabited
as such. Plaintiff contended there was a good common law marriage, as
the statute did not .expressly make such a marriage void. Held, that the
marriage was invalid. The history and legislation of the colonists prior to
the adoption of the common law indicates that a non-ceremonial marriage
was not thought to be .suitable to our institutions, and hence the common
law rule respecting marriages was never adopted by us. Wilmington Trust
Co. v. Hemlrix-soti (Del., 1921), II4 Atl. 215.
The majority of American courts hold: that a non-ceremonial marriage,
being good at common law, is still valid, unless its validity is expressly nullified by statute. Meister v. Moore, g6 U. S. 76; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn.
327; lTe'j1t11ami v. Heymann, 218 Ill. 636. It has been held in England by the
House of Lords that a non-ceremonial marriage did not constitute a full
marriage at common law, but only gave either party the right to compel
solemnization by application to the ecclesiastical courts. . Regina v. Millis
(1844), IO Clark & F. 534- This decision by the House of Lords came after
many American courts had recognized that a non-ceremonial marriage was
good at common law. Hence, in many American jurisdictions we have
adopted as the common law what the House of Lords has declared was not
the common law. Several American courts have, however, since that decision, held that a non-ceremonial marriage is valid, oecause at the time the
common law was adopted in this country such a marriage was considered
to be good. Dj•er v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391; Carmichael v. State, 12 0. St.
553. The Missouri court in Dyer v. Brannock, supra, stated that the common law adopted in this country was the common law as expounded by Sir
William Blackstone and Chancellor Kent, and not the common law as expounded by the House of Lords. In Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, the
court followed the English rule, and held that as we have no tribunal, as
in England, clothed with the power to enforce the solemnization of marriages
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between parties contracting per verba de praesenti, this part of the common law was not adopted by them. The majority of American courts, however, holding that a common law marriage is invalid do so upon the ground
that statutes providing that marriages shall be celebrated by certain persons
and imposing a fine upon any unauthorized person solemnizing a marriage
are mandatory and not directory. Ann Gas. l912D, 597, and cases there
cited. In several American states which formerly recognized a common
law marriage the rule has been changed by statute. Sclmmacher v. Great
Northem Ry. Co., 23 N. D. 231; Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620; Ann Gas.
l912D, 597. The principal case seems to be in accord with the legislative
tendency to recognize as valid only a ceremonial marriage.
p ARTIES-CAPACITY TO Sus AND BE Susn---UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS.

-An unincorporated association was sued in its own name. Held, that even
though there was a general appearance by tpe defendant, the court did not
get jurisdiction, because a "suable party" is necessary to jurisdiction. Grand
111ternatio11al Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green (Ala., 1921),
89 So. 435.
_At common law an unincorporated association cannot sue nor be sued
in its own name, but only in the names of the individual members. Dien
ON PARTIES, Rule 20, p. l6g. Many decisions support the view that the rule
is one of form rather than of substance. In Beatty and Ritchie v. K1trtz, 2
Peters 566, the members of a committee sued in their own names in behalf
of an association, and Justice Story said: "* * * we do not perceive any
serious objection to their right to maintain the suit." See also Guilfoil v.
Arthur, 158 Ill. 6oo. Failure of the defendant to take advantage of the want
of capacity to sue on the part of an unincorporated association by means
of a demurrer or plea waives the defect. Franklfo Union v. People, 220 Ill.
355. In Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union No. r6, 232 Ill. 402, an
injunction issued against an unincorporated association in its own name was
sustained. The want of capacity to be sued was described as "but a technical objection" in Krug Furniture Co. v. Unio1i of Woodworkers, 5 Ont.
L. Rep. 463. See, contra, The Proprietors of the Me.xicai~ Mill v. The YellOw
Jacket Silver Mining Co., 4 Nevada 40, where the court held that a suit
brought in a co-partnership associate name was a "nullity." In Crawley v.
A111ericaii Society of Equity, 153 Wis. 13, the defendant, an unincorporated
association, was sued in its own name. It answered and litigated the merits,
and then raised the question of its capacity to be sued. The court said:
"* * * in view of the tendency to more and more brush aside non-prejudicial
technicalities in order that substantial justice may be done *
if plaintiff
so desires, the action may proceed to judgment against those who were
members of the board of directors * * *·" Under similar facts, the court in
Deems et al. v. Albaiiy & Canal Line, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3736, held that it
was too late for the defendant to object that it was not properly sued'. Moreover, with respect to its capacity to sue or be sued, an unincorporated asso·
ciation is regarded exactly as a partnership. DICEY ON PARTIES (2d Am. ed.),
p. l]O. It has been held that where a partnership sued in its own name_ the
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defendant waived the defect by going to" trial on: the merits. Ortez v. Jewett
& Co., 23 Ala. 662; Moore v. Watts, 81 Ala. 261; Foreman v. Weil Bro~.,
98 Ala. 495; Mitchell & Bro. v. Railto1i, 45 Mo. App. 273; Fowler & Wild
v. Williams, 62 Mo. 403. A judgment obtained by a partnership in the partnership name is valid. Ives v. Mtihlenburg et al., 135 Ill. App. 517; Be1111ett ·
v. Child, 19 Wis. 362; (dictmn) Weldo1i v. Fisher, 194 Mo. App. 573. Contra:
Hitch v. Gray & Co., I Marv. (Del.) 400; Simmo1is .et al. v. Titche Bros.,
102 Ala. 317 (judgment by default). Where the defendant is sued in its
partnership name and makes no objection, the defect is cured by verdict.
Seitz & Co. v. Buffum & Co., 14 Pa. St. 6g; Simonton et al. v. Rohm et al.,
14 Col. 51. A judgment against a partnership in its partnership name is
valid. In Heavrin v. Lack Malleable Iron Co., 153 Ky. 329, the court said:
''In such a case partners actually making defense for and on behalf of the
partnership, and for and on behalf of themselves in the partnership name,
will be treated as the real parties in interest and as the real defendants, and
therefore bound by the judgment. Any other rule would make the administration of justice depend not on a fair and impartial trial but on mere
tricks and subterfuges." Contra: Weldo1i v. Fisher, supra; Metropolitati
St. Ry. Co. v. Adams Express Co., 145 Mo. App. 371. The reason for
describing a party by name is to identify him. Therefore, where parties
without objection: allow themselves to be designated by the name of an
association, and appear in court under that name, there would seem to be
no good reason why the court should not take jurisdiction over them.
Rur,E IN SHEr.LEy's CAs~!N'rERPRm'A'rION AND CoNS'rRUC'tION oF DEEDS

Wrr.r.s.-S conveyed the tract in question to his wife for life, remainder
to his daughters, A and L, and their heirs after them, and in case either or
both A and L should die without heirs of their bodies, then the tract to be:
divided between his son, L C, and his (L C's) heirs, and if only one should
die without heirs, her half to be divided between the other and L C's heirs.
L died without issue, and L C conveyed to M. In an action to try title
between L C's children and M, held, that the words "heirs" and "heirs of
the body" were used in a non-technical sense to mean children; that the
words "either or" in the first condition were used by inadvertence, and thus
L C's children were entitled to an undivided half of L's share in the tract.
Shugart v. Slmgart (Tex. Civ. App., 1921), 233 S. W. 303.
In a very similar case, the testator, after various specific gifts, left the
residue of his real and personal property, comprising the bulk of his estate,
to his wife for life, remainder one half to her heirs, or devisees if she should
leave a will, and the other half to specified blood relatives of himself. The
wife died intestate, and a few days later the testator became 1101i compos
me11tis, remaining so until his death. In a bill praying for construction of
the will, held, the Rule in Shelley's Case applies to the realty, and the wife
would have taken a fee in one half had she lived, but since the devise lapsed
the heirs of the testator are entitled! thereto. Belleville Savings Bank v.
Aneshaeiisel (Ill., 1921), 131 N. E. 682.
The Rule in Shelley's Case, that where, in the same instrument, a freeAND
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hold is limited to the ancestor and a remainder to his heirs, the word "heirs"
is a word of limitation and not of purchase (1 Co. 104a), is admitted by
both the Texas and Illinois courts to be a rule of law and not of construction, and is to be applied, if at all, regardless of the testator's intent. The
question in every case is to determine whether "heirs" was used in the technical sense, as referring to those persons entitled under the laws of descent
and distribution to the real property of one dying intestate, or is used to
denote particular persons or class of persons. If "heirs" is used in the
latter sense the rule has no application. Archer's Case, l Co. 66b; Van
Gruttm v. Fozwell (1897), 22 App. Cas. 658; Stisser v. Stisser, 235 Ill. 207.
In the Texas case the court reaches the conclusion that by "heirs" tli~
grantor meant "children" because of the indiscriminate use of "heirs" and
"heirs of the body" and the impossibility of giving effect to the provision
for dividing the -remainder between L C and his heirs. In the Illinois case
the court says that the testator meant "blood relatives" of his wife when he
said "heirs," and effect is given to his obvious intent as regards the personality, although the court feels bound by the Rule as regards the realty. If
it is meant by this that "heirs" was used in the technical sense-the testator
supposing that his wife's heirs would be composed of her blood relatives,
and not providing for the contingency which actually occurred, viz., his surviving his wife and his incapacity for changing his will thereafter-then
the two cases can be distinguished. It is felt, however, that the less conservative Texas court would have given effect to the testator's intent as
regards both the realty and the personalty had the facts in the Illinois case
been before it.
SPJ::cnnc PSru;"oRYANCS---."Nm.L AND Vom" PRoviso CoNSTRUSD "VomABLF;" AT VSNDSs's 0Pl'ION.-Defendant agreed in writing to sell plaintiff
certain real estate. The contract provided that if, for any reason, a good
and marketable title could not be given, "this agreement shall be null and
void, and the sum paid on account as above provided shall be returned by
the party of the first part in lieu of all claims for damages or otherwise."
Plaintiff contended that "11ull and void" meant "voidable" at the option of
the vendee, and insisted upon such performance as defendant could give,
though the title was not marketable. He.Id, (one judge dissenting), that
defendant must give performance, apparently upon payment of full purchase price without abatement. Medoff v. Va11dersaal (Pa., July, 1921),
II4 Atl. 618.
It is significant that the majority opinion was unable to disclose a single
case to support its view. The dissenting judge cited three cases supporting
the view that the contract was null and void as to both parties if the title
was not marketable. In the first of those cases the contract provided that
if the title was not marketable the agreement should be "void, and delivered
up" and cancelled. The court said: "They might both think it would be
equally to their interest that the agreement should be put an end to if the
counsel of the purchaser should be of opinion that a marketable title could
not be made." Williams v. Edwards (1827), 2 Simons 79. In the second
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case the language of the agreement, was, "this agreement shall be void,
and the above two hundred dollars refunded." The court said : "The provision is absolute that this agreement-1. e., the whole agreement-shall be
void." Mackey v. Ames (1883), 31 Minn. 103. In the last case considered
by the dissenting judge the contract provided: "It is agreed that if the title
to said premises is not good, and cannot bCi made good, this agreement shall
be void and the above $50 refunded." The court was of the opinion that
the contract contained no ambiguity, and was void as to both parties, adding:
"The rule of practical construction applies only in cases where the contract
is indefinite, uncertain, or susceptible of different interpretations." Schwab
v. Baremore (1905), 95 Minn. 295. The writer was able to find only one
other case where the provisions in the contract were practically identical
with those of the principal case. That case was decided like the last three
considered. Marchman v. Fowler (1916), 145 Ga. 682. In Weatherford v.
James (1841), 2 Ala. 170, the defendant contracted to sell certain lands if
he could give a marketable title, and further agreed that if he could not
give such title he would execute a mortgage upon certain slaves to secure
l'epayment of the purchase money. He could not give a marketable title,
but the court held that a conveyance with abatement could not be demanded
of the defendant, the theory being that the contract to convey the land
depended absolutely upon the contingency. For cases analogous to the
principal case, in which it was held that the vendor could not be compelled
to perform, see Duddell v. Simpson (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. 102; Mawson v.
Fletcher (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 91; Hoy v. Smythies (1856), 22 Beav. 510.
For the same interpretation of a statute where a similar question was raised,
see M1mdy v. Shellaberger, 161 Fed. 503.
SPECIFIC P:e&FORMANct-Rm.mF ON TI-:RMS VARYING FROY TH~ CoNTRAC'l'.

-Plaintiff contracted to buy and the defendant to sell certain real property.
About $1,000 had been paid. On February l an interest installment fell due
and was unpaid. On April 12 the vendor served notice of forfeiture pursuant to the terms of the contract. On April 23 he sold the premises to a
third party, who had notice of the facts. On April 27 the plaintiff tendered
the amount due, with the excuse that he had not known it was overdue.
Tender was refused. Plaintiff sued for specific performance. Held, upon
payment within 30 days of the entire unpaid purchase price (although the
remainder of the price, amounting to about $3,000, would not have fallen
due under the terms of the contract for some years to come), all interest
and taxes in arrears, compensation for improvements made by the third
party purchaser, $so attorney's fees, and costs, the plaintiff may recover.
H11bbell v. Ohler (1921), 213 Mich. 664
In spite of the express terms of the contract, the Michigan court
declined to permit a forfeiture of the payments made. The underlying
principle of the decision is not new to equity jurisprudence. "Equity abhors
a forfeiture." The treatment accorded the express provisions of the mort-gage is closely analogous. Richmond v. Robinso1i, 12 Mich. 193· The interesting feature of the decision in the principal case is the fact that the court,
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in decreeing specific performance, brushes aside the express terms of the
contract, and in an attempt to adjust the rights of the litigants equitably, lays
.down its own terms. The equity of the plaintiff's position was far from strong.
He had no better excuse for the delay in payment than oversight, and he
had permitted waste on the premises. Consequently, his remissness was
very properly reflected in the decree. Note that he was required, as a condition precedent to receiving conveyance, to pay the entire unpaid purchase
price within 30 days, although under the terms of the contract he would
have had some 28. years in which to pay. It has been argued that the court
must enforce the contract literally or not at all,-that it cannot make over
the agreement of the parties. But this argument is not tenable. Decreeing
relief lies wholly within the discretion of the court and the terms of relief
may be moulded to fit the circumstances of each case. If the plaintiff's
equities are strong the decree may be lenient; if weak, harsh; if too weak,
relief may be refused altogether. Or4inarily, however, compensation can
be required for the delay without punishing it by forfeiture. In Nayes v.
Bragg, 220 Mass. 106, another suit by vendee against vendor, it is true that
the appellate court reversed the superior court, which had ordered present
payment of future installments, and ordered the contract to be performed
literally according to its terms, thereby giving the vendee the benefit of the
installment plan of payment. However, in that controversy the vendor was
at fault and the conduct of the vendee was unimpeachable. In King v:
Ruckman, 24 N. J. Eq. 556, the court, instead of accelerating the date of
payment, as in the principal case, or enforcing the terms of the contract
literally, as in Noyes v. Bragg, actually extended the time of payment beyond
that agreed to by the parties. The vendor had wrongfully kept the vendee
from taking possession for five years beyond the agreed date, and he was
very properly penalized for his conduct. So the terms of the contract are
not necessarily sacred. Yet courts have not always recognized the possibility of the decree cy pres, and have often contented themselves with a
literal enforcement of the contract or nothing. The obvious equity of a
modification of the agreed terms under certain circumstances compels commendation of such action. The chancellor is thereby given a really effective
weapon for the enforcement of fair dealing in business transactions. The
principal case is worthy of note as an illustration of the exercise of such
power.
STATU'J.'J; OF FRAUDS-SUFFI<:mNCY OF M£MORANDUM-0MISSION OF

fiRM

FAvoRAnr.:e '.rO TH£ D:eF:eNDANT.-Vendee seeking specific performance of a
contract for sale of land, stated as one of the terms agreed upon that he
(vendee) was to assume a mortgage for $800 then existing on the property,
and to give an additional mortgage for $1,200 to make up the $2,000 balance
which would be due under the contract. The memorandum offered to prove
the contract, although apparently sufficient in all respects to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, made no mention of this mortgage of $8oo or its assumption by the vendee, but indicated rather that the vendee was to give a mortgage for the entire $2,000. Held, by a divided court, that the memorandum
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was insufficient because of the omission of this term. Ge11dlema1i v. M 011gillo (Conn., 1921), II4 Atl. 914
· On its face the majority view seems merely to be in accord with the
established rule that the memorandum must includ'e all the essential terms.
agreed upon and that the time and manner of payment are essential terms.
Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 209 Fed. 291; Lester v. Heidt, 86 Ga. 226, IO L. R.
A,. 108; Ebert v. Culleii, 165 Mich. 75, 33 L. R A. [n. s.] 84. It is probably
true that the parties to the transaction did not themselves ·regard the omitted
term as essential, since they did not deem' it necessary to include it in a
memorandum which was in other respects apparently complete, nor did
defendant object to its sufficiency on this ground at the trial. But what the
parties thought cannot be allowed to modify the requirements of the statute.
Wright v. Weeks, 25 N. Y. 153; Stewart v. Cook, n8 Ga. 541; Hamby v.
Trnitt, 14 Ga. Ap. 515. On another ground, however, the correctness of
the decision is not so evident. It is difficult to understand in what way the
term omitted from the memorandum could be detrimental to the vendor.
Presumably, it was for his benefit-e. g., to save him the trouble of paying
off this mortgage and then accepting one for a like amount from the vendee
as part of the purchase price. In England it has been held that where the
memorandum omits a term of the verbal agreement which is for the defendt.
·ant's benefit the defendant cannot set up the statute if the plaintiff is willing to admit this term as part of the contract. Martin v. Pycroft, 2 D. M.
& G. 785. See also Vouill01~ v. States, 25 L. J. (Ch.) 875, and North v.
Loonies [1919], i Ch. 378. There appear to be no American decisions
directly in accord with the English case, but even so, it is somewhat difficult
to understand why the court in the principal case should have been so solicitous for the defendant's rights under the statute. Surely nothing could be
further from the intent and spirit of the Statute of Frauds than putting a
penalty upon the plaintiff's honesty in offering the defendant the benefit of
a term which he, the defendant, would himself have been prevented from
claiming by operation of the statute and the parol evidence rule. It is to
be regretted if the English modification· is not open to adoption by the American courts, as this decision by the Connecticut court would seem to indicate.
It may be observed, however, that there is no indication in the court's opinion that these English authorities were called to its notice.
TroAL-GENI>RAL EXCEPTION TO INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ro JURY.-Where the
record showed an absence of exceptions to the charge, but counsel averred
that he had' asked for an exception and the court sealed it for him mmc pro
tune, this was regarded as a general exception to the charge, but held that
under a general exception only such matters as were basic and fundamental
could be assigned as error. Marshall v. Carr (Pa., 1921), II4 Atl. 500.
This decision is in accord with previous Pennsylvania decisions on this
question, and the courts of that state have declared the following to be ba.i;ic
and fundamental errors and assignable under a general exception: "All
actual errors of law"; "material matter so inadequately presented as to be.
likely to mislead the jury''; "failure of whole charge to present the material
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issues involved in the case." Sikorski v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1918),
260 Pa. 243; Mastel .v. Walker (1914), 246 Pa. 65. But basic and fundamental errors were not ordinarily assignable under a general exception. The
courts would not look for "errors of law" within a charge, but only to the
charge as a whole. "A general exception to the charge brings before the
court only its propriety as a whole. And if, as a whole, it is not a misdirection, not calculated to mislead the jury, the judgment will not be
reversed." THOMPSON oN TluALs (Ed. 2), Vol. II, p. 1650. "It is well settled that if a series of propositions be embodied in instructions, and the
instructions be excepted to in a mass, if any one of the propositions be correct the exception must be overruled." Johnston v. Jones (1861), I Black
220; Rogers v. the Marshal (1863), 1 Wall. 644 Where the appellant
requested! four charges and excepted generally to the court's refusal to give
them, held the request w'as in bulk, and the exception must fail if any one
charge so requested was bad. Gains v. State, (1907), 149 Ala. 29. But where
a special charge was requested and refused, and general exception taken
to the whole charge, the request to charge was held to sufficiently call the
attention of the court to the special charge, and its refusal was assignable
under the general exception. Fitzgerald v. Metropolita1~ Life Ins. Co. (Vt.,
1916), g8 Atl. 4g8. Where the appellant excepted generally and had asked
an instruction that there was no evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff,
held that the question raised by the charge whether the expense of a trip
be deducted from the recovery was not assignable. Ra1~om & Randolph
Co. v. Pinches (1916), 234 Fed. 847. The principal case seems liberal in
giving the appellant the full benefit of his exception. The assignment of
basic and fundamental errors under general exception is so valuable a right
that where a general exception is not allowed by the court, because of the
allowance of a number of special exceptions, this is held to be reversible
error. Torak v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1915), 6o Pa. Sup. Ct. 248.
~

WILI,S-LAttNT AMBIGUITY-ADMISSION OF ORAI. DECI.ARATIONS OF TESTATOR.-The testatrix, by her will, gave the residue of her estate in the fol·lowing words, "to my heirs and to be distributed to them according to law."
This action was brought to secure an order of distribution to all the heirs
under the terms of the will At the trial the blood relatives of the testatrix
offered to prove certain oral declarations of the testatrix, made at the time
of the execution of the will, to show that the word's above quoted were
intended to refer only to her own kin. Held, that this evidence was properly excluded. fore Watts' Estate (Calif., 1921), lg8 Pac. 1036.
This case was decided on the basis of Sections 1318 and 1340 of the
California Civil Code, which provide for the explanation· of latent ambiguities in wills by extrinsic evidence, but provide specifically that evidence of
testator's declarations are inadmissible. But it seems likely that the holding
would have been the same had there been no provision of the statute relative thereto, for it has been long .established: that parol evidence cannot be
admitted to add to, contradict, or vary the contents of the will. See note
in 17 MICH. L. REv. 178. In Day v. Webler, 93 Conn. 3o8, the scrivener was
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allowed to testify as to declarations made by the testatrix regarding the
use of the term "children" in her will. On appeal, this was assigned as
error, and the court held that the evidence should not have been admitted.
The court there says, "what he has written determines the testator's intent,
and where the language is clear and precise, and, the person or thing exists
and is accurately named, extrinsic circumstances surrounding the testator
cannot detach the langnage used from its primary significance. Extrinsic
circumstances may explain the language of the will: they cannot contradict,
vary, or control it." See also Williams v. Williams, 182 Ky. 738; Lamb v.
Jordan, 233 Mass. 335. In re Spencer's, EstaJe, 181 Cal. 514, held that interpretive testimony was inadmissible to show that the word "personal" in a
residuary bequest to "personal legatees named" in the will was not used to
differentiate people from corporations named, but to distinguish personal
friends from relatives. The court there said, "there is no ambiguity in the
language, and: therefore no reason for interpretive testimony. We know of
no use of the word 'personal,' either technical or colloquial, which would
justify its employ111ent in distinguishing those not related from those who
are." The same situation existed in the principal case. The word "heirs"
can admit of only one legal interpretation, as far as this case is concerned,
and to admit extrinsic evidence to show that something different was meant
would be to allow the oral declarations of the testator to be substituted for
the written will.
WILLS-VALID IN PART AND Vom IN PART--EFFEC'l' oF Vom Cr.Aus~s
Wn.r..-After providing that no property was to be sold for
a period of fifty years after the probate of his will at which time the property was to be sold and the proceeds distributed in accordance with its provisions, the testator devised all of his property to his daughter forever,
but if she died without issue, then to the nephews and nieces of his own
blood. The daughter died without issue. The nephews and nieces claimed
under the will and it was contended that the clause suspending alienation
being void, the whole will was void~ Held, as the devise to the nephews and
nieces was not dependent in any way upon the void clause, and as the property would go to those to whom the testator intended it should go, the void
clause might be struck out and the valid part allowed to stand. Quilliam v.
U11io1i Trust Co. (Ind., 19~u), 131 N. E. 428.
The general rule seems to be that where there are valid and invalid
clauses in the same will, the good will be allowed to stand; unless the valid
and invalid clauses are so closely connected as to constitute one entire
scheme for the disposition of the estate, so that the presumed wishes of
the testator would be defeated if one portion were retained and the other
portion rejected. The big question, therefore, is, when are clauses so closely
connected that by retaining a part and rejecting the others the intention of
the testator is thereby defeated? The distinction lies in the scheme, or lack
of a scheme, employed by the testator in disposing of his property. If the
testator devises directly to the beneficiaries, and a future interest created
by the same instrument is void, the prior interests become what they would
UPON PROBA~D
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have been had the limitation of the future estates been omitted from the
instrument. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPSTUITmS, par. 247, 248, and cases
there cited. Where, however, the testator does not devise directly to beneficiaries, but creates a trust and seeks to dispose of his property by that
means, the valid and invalid clauses are not independent, but are links in
one entire scheme created to carry out a common purpose. To execute only
a part would be to make a new will for the testator, and therefore the whole
trust must stand or fall together. Barrett v. Barrett, 225 Ill. 332; Reid v.
Voorhees, 216 Ill. 236. In the latter case the argument was advanced that
if the interest covered by the valid clauses would not be changed by excluding
the invalid clauses, the good should be allowed to stand. The court said
this was in disregard of the cardinal principle of wills, for by the trust the
testator had created one entire scheme for the disposal of all his property,
and to hold that his scheme must fail in so far as he sought to dispose of
the corpus of his estate, but might be sustained as to the life estates, would
be to make a will which the testator never intended. In the above cases the
void clauses disposed of the corpus of the estate. Where the testator devised
his property in trust, and the void clauses disposed of life interests, or were
limitations over after a fee, and the corpus of the estate was covered by
the valid clauses, the good were allowed to stand. Herron v. Stanton (Ind.,
1920), 128 N. E. 363; fore Thaw (1917), 169 N. Y. Supp. 430. In Tyler v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, a trust was created for the disposal of the
property and the clause disposing of the corpus of the estate was void. The
court allowed the valid clauses to stand and held that the modern rule permits the estate to progress under the will up to the point where the rule
against perpetuities begins to operate. In that case, however, the beneficiaries
under the will were the same persons who would have taken under the statute
of descent and distribution. The result of the cases seems to be that in
cases of trusts, if the primary purpose of the testator is accomplished by
probating the valid portions, they will be allowed' to stand, provided no manifest injustice would result to the beneficiaries by such a construction. Such
an injustice results when the beneficiaries under the valid clauses would not
only take under the will but would also share in the property covered by
the invalid clauses if it were declared intestate. Benedict v. Webb, 98 N. Y.
460; Reid v. Voorhees, supra. In Beatty v. Stanley (Ill., 1921), 131 N. E.
687, the testator made bequests of personalty and then devised all his realty
in trust. The trust was void and the court held that the bequests must also
fall. In that case the beneficiaries of the bequests would! share in the intestate property, but as the beneficiaries of the invalid clauses would not, it is
difficult to see how any injustice would result.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-"AccIDENTAI, INJURy''-INJURY CAUSED BY
Exc1TEMENT.-The plaintiff, while performing his duties as foreman in the
defendant's coal yard, became engaged in a heated argument with a teamster.
Threats were made, but no blows were struck. A few minutes later the
plaintiff suffered a cerebral hemorrhage which caused a paralytic stroke.
Held, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatioµ under the Workmen's Com-
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pensation Act. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Com. et al., (Ill., 1921), 131 N.

E. 649.
The ratio decide11di is not clearly stated. The court says that there is
not adequate proof that the quarrel caused the injury. If this is the real
ground for its holding, the result, undoubtedly, is correct. On the other hand,
the court seems to doubt whether a physical injury due to fright or excitement can be the basis for liability. Apparently, the reason for its reluctance
in admitting liability in such cases is the doctrii{'e in tort law which denies
recovery for physical injury due to~ mental or nervous shock and not to a
physical impact. See Braim v. Crave1i, 175 Ill. 40I. In recent years many
courts have frankly abandoned this rule. See I8 MICH. L. R.Ev. 332, commenting upon Janvier v. Sweeney, [I9I9], 2 K. B. 3I6, where the court
allowed recovery for illness resulting from a nervous shock induced by
false words and threats upon the part of the defendant. There the writer
points out that the only reasons advanced in support of the old rule are
without foundation in fact. See, also, 4I AM. LAW. Rm. I4I. In the first
cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act the courts emphasized the
idea of an external injury to the physical structure of the body. 25 HARV.
L. R.Ev. 337. Then it was held that even the bacillus of anthrax could furnish the necessary physical phenomenon. Brintons, Limited, v. Turuey,_
[I905], A. C. 230; also, Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Com., 29I
Ill. 6!6. Soon this unsatisfactory test was discarded. Recovery was allowed
for any disease of sudden origin: (heat from furnace), Isma'y, Imrie & Co.
v. Williamson, [I908], A. C. 437; (sunstroke), Morgaii v. S. S. Zenaida, 25
T. L. R. 446. Also for intern:il physical injuries due to one's own muscular
exertion. Clover, Clayto1i & Co., Ltd., v. Hughes, [I910], A. C. 242; Baggot
Co. v. Industrial Cam., 290 Ill. 530, 7 A. L. R. I6II. See Crosby v. Thorp,
Hawley & Co., 2o6 Mich. 250, 6 A. L. R. I253, commented upon in I8 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 72, and cited with approval by the court. Then in Yates v. South
Kirkby, etc., Collieries, Ltd., [1910], 2 K. B. 538, where the plaintiff was
incapacitated by a nervous shock caused by the excitement and alarm resulting from a fatal accident to a fellO\V workman, the court allowed compensation. One judge said, "In my opinion, nervous shock due to accident
which causes personal incapacity to work is as much 'personal injury by accident' as a broken leg." A rule, like that suggested by the principal case,
which would make the right to compensation depend not on the injury but
on the character of the means producing it, is both illogical and unjust.

